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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1540 
___________ 
 
LORETTA BURTON, 
      Appellant 
v. 
 
OZBURN HESSEY LOGISTIC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-01068) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 17, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 23, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Loretta Burton appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of her 
complaint.  We will affirm. 
 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. 
 In 2012, Burton filed two cases (which were consolidated) in the District Court 
alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
621-624, against her former employer, Ozburn Hessey Logistics (“OHL”).  (See M.D. Pa. 
Civ. A. No. 1:12-cv-1740.)  Her claims arose from her January 2012 termination from 
employment, which she asserted was unlawfully based on her age and her race.  The 
District Court granted OHL’s motion for summary judgment on July 21, 2014, and 
Burton did not appeal from that decision.  
 In June 2014, prior to the District Court’s decision in her 2012 case, Burton filed 
an additional complaint against OHL relating to her termination from employment.  
(M.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 1:14-cv-1068.)  The claims in her June 2014 complaint are far 
from clear, but seem to be based on information contained in the discovery documents 
from her 2012 case, and assert that OHL terminated her employment in retaliation for 
Burton’s filing of a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.  She also asserted that 
OHL’s statement that she had not suffered a work-related injury1 (which led to the denial 
                                                          
1 According to the District Court’s decision in Burton’s 2012 case, at the conclusion of a 
November 23, 2011 meeting with her supervisor, at which she received a “final warning” 
and suspension for poor job performance, Burton fainted and fell to the floor.  Burton v. 
Ozburn Hessey Logistics, No. 12-cv-1740, 2014 WL 3573497, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 
2014).  She was transported by emergency responders to the hospital and treated for her 
injuries.  “Burton subsequently submitted documentation from her treating physicians 
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of workers’ compensation benefits) constituted defamation and slander, that her 
application for unemployment benefits under Pennsylvania law was unlawfully denied, 
and that OHL continued to defame and slander her by giving bad referrals to potential 
employers.  On July 28, 2014, Burton filed yet another complaint, which again stated that 
OHL had retaliated against her for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and 
also seemed to challenge the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board’s 2014 
decision to deny benefits.  (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1:14-cv-1446.)  OHL answered both 
complaints and later filed motions to dismiss them on res judicata and other grounds.2  
 In September 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending that the 
District Court consolidate the 2014 cases for all purposes. The District Court overruled 
Burton’s objections to the report, and on December 11, 2014, consolidated the two cases 
under Civ. A. No. 14-cv-1068.  The District Court explained that consolidation was 
appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) because the two actions arose out of common 
questions of law and fact involving the termination of Burton’s employment, her alleged 
work-related injury, and her workers’ compensation claim. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
excusing her from work through December 13, 2011.”  Id.  After she apparently did not 
return to work, OHL terminated her employment in January 2012.  Id. 
2 OHL did not specify the rule under which it sought dismissal, but we construe its 
motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings because OHL had answered Burton’s 
complaints.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (c).  Although OHL attached evidentiary material 
to its motion, the District Court did not convert it into a motion for summary judgment, 
and the evidentiary material was not necessary to its resolution of the res judicata issue, 
which may be decided under Rule 12(c).  See Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 
239, 260 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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 Thereafter, the Magistrate Judge recommended granting OHL’s motions to 
dismiss after determining that Burton’s Title VII claims were barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata, and that the District Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Burton’s state law claims, which the Magistrate Judge recommending dismissing with 
prejudice.  The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the District Court deny OHL’s 
motion for attorney’s fees and costs.  The District Court rejected Burton’s objections to 
the Magistrate Judge’s report (noting that most of the objections concerned the 
consolidation order), and on January 30, 2015 adopted the report as to the dismissal of 
Burton’s federal claims under the res judicata doctrine.  The District Court also agreed 
that it should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Burton’s state law claims, but 
dismissed those claims without prejudice so that Burton would not be precluded from 
bringing them in state court.  Finally, the District Court denied OHL’s motion for fees 
and costs, finding no error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Burton’s claims were 
“not merely designed to harass.”  
 Burton timely appealed.3  
II.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 
                                                          
3 OHL has moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed.  Burton was required to file a 
notice of appeal with the District Court within thirty days of its January 30, 2014 order.  
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).  Although we did not docket her appeal until March 3, 2015, 
she filed her notice of appeal with the District Court on February 27, 2015.  Burton’s 
appeal is therefore timely, and we hereby deny OHL’s motion to dismiss.  
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dismissals based on res judicata (also called claim preclusion).  See Elkadrawy v. 
Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the District Court’s 
consolidation order for abuse of discretion.  See Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Gateway 
Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., L.P., --- F.3d ----, 2015 WL 2107288, at *1 (3d Cir. 
May 7, 2015).   
 Burton is primarily concerned with the District Court’s consolidation order, 
claiming that it violated her due process rights.  She is mistaken.  As the District Court 
explained, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), it has discretion to consolidate actions involving 
“a common question of law or fact.”  Here, both of Burton’s 2014 complaints concerned 
her November 2011injury, her application for workers’ compensation benefits, and her 
January 2012 termination from employment.  The District Court acted well within its 
discretion in consolidating the actions, and Burton’s rights to pursue her claims were not 
undermined by the consolidation.    
 To the extent that Burton’s complaints set forth any employment discrimination 
claims under Title VII, the District Court properly determined that those claims were 
barred by res judicata.  Res judicata requires: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a 
prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on 
the same cause of action.”  Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quotation marks omitted).  This doctrine bars not only claims that have been litigated, 
but also those claims that could have been asserted in the prior action.  Id. 
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 The District Court correctly determined that all of the elements necessary for res 
judicata to apply were satisfied, and therefore, that Burton’s federal claims were barred. 
First, a final judgment was issued in Plaintiff’s 2012 lawsuit on July 21, 2014, when the 
District Court granted OHL’s motion for summary judgment.  The fact that Burton filed 
her first 2014 complaint before entry of judgment in the 2012 case had no effect on the 
application of res judicata.  See Murphy v. Landsburg, 490 F.2d 319, 323 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(holding that, “[t]o be given res judicata . . . effect, a judgment need not be entered prior 
to the commencement of the action in which the binding effect of the judgment is 
sought”).  Second, both cases involve the same parties.  
 Third, scrutiny of the complaints leaves no doubt that this action arises from the 
same events as the earlier case.  See Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (stating that whether res judicata applies depends on the “essential similarity 
of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims” rather than the “specific 
legal theory invoked”); Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173.  Burton’s only claim that could be 
considered as arising under Title VII or federal law is that OHL terminated her 
employment in retaliation for her filing a workers’ compensation claim.  This claim is 
indisputably connected to the 2012 action in that they arise out of the same employment 
relationship and derive from the same act of alleged discrimination (her termination of 
employment).  Moreover, there is no doubt that Burton could have raised her retaliation 
allegations in her 2012 complaint.  That she may have learned additional information 
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supporting her claims has no bearing on whether she could have brought the claim in her 
original complaint.  See Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173-74.  Accordingly, any claims that 
Burton sought to raise under Title VII related to her November 2011 injury or January 
2012 termination of employment were properly determined to be barred by res judicata.  
 Burton’s remaining allegations, including defamation, slander, and her attempts to 
receive Pennsylvania unemployment and/or workers’ compensation benefits, all arise 
under state law, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Burton’s state law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).  Further, Burton seems to be under 
the impression that her July 2014 complaint is a proper appeal from the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, and that the dismissal of her 
complaint “closed” her claim for workers’ compensation benefits.  This is incorrect, as 
the District Court had no jurisdiction over any such appeal, which, as the Appeal Board’s 
opinion stated, must be filed in Pennsylvania state court. 
 Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  OHL’s 
“Motion for Unreasonable Attorney’s Fees and Costs” is hereby denied.4 
                                                          
4 We note that OHL did not file a notice of appeal from the District Court’s decision 
denying its motion for attorney’s fees and costs.  
